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This Note will examine the applicability of the countervailing duty law to nonmarket economies.
Part I will review the legislative history of the countervailing duty statute and its judicial and ad-
ministrative interpretations. Part II will discuss the Commerce Department rulings, the Court of
International Trade’s reversal of these rulings in Continental Steel Corp. v. United States and the
Federal Circuit’s reversal of the CIT. Finally, Part III will analyze both approaches to the issue.
This Note will conclude that the counterveiling duty law should apply to goods from nonmarket
economies.
THE APPLICABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES




The countervailing duty law' is one of the principal
nontariff barriers2 used by the United States to combat unfair
1. United States countervailing duty law is embodied in the Tariff Act of 1930,
ch. 497, tit. III, § 303, 46 Stat. 687 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982)).
The Tariff Act provides as follows:
(a) Levy of countervailing duties
(1) Except in the case of an article or merchandise which is the product of a
country under the Agreement (within the meaning of section 167 1(b) of this
title), whenever any country, dependency, colony, province, or other polit-
ical subdivision of government, person, partnership, association, cartel, or
corporation, shall pay or bestow, directly or indirectly, any bounty or grant
upon the manufacture or production or export of any article or merchandise
manufactured or produced in such country, dependency, colony, province,
or other political subdivision of government, then upon the importation of
such article or merchandise into the United States, whether the same shall
be imported directly from the country of production or otherwise, and
whether such article or merchandise is imported in the same condition as
when exported from the country of production or has been changed in con-
dition by remanufacture or otherwise, there shall be levied and paid, in all
such cases, in addition to any duties otherwise imposed, a duty equal to the
net amount of such bounty or grant, however the same be paid or bestowed.
(2) In the case of any imported article or merchandise which is free of duty,
duties may be imposed under this section only if there are affirmative deter-
minations by the Commission under subtitle IX of this chapter; except that
such a determination shall not be required unless a determination of injury
is required by the international obligations of the United States.
Id.
2. Nontariff barriers are obstructions to international trade other than customs
duties or taxes on importation. See 2 R. STURM, CUSTOMS LAws & ADMINISTRATION
§ 61.2(c) (1985); S. METZGER, LOWERING NONTARIFF BARRIERS 7 (1974); see also infra
note 3 (discussion of use of nontariff barriers). The President of the United States
has authority to enter into trade agreements to reduce or eliminate nontariff barriers.
See 19 U.S.C. § 2112(b) (1982). The term nontariff barrier "cover[s] a variety of
devices which distort trade, including quotas, variable levies, border taxes, discrimi-
natory procurement and internal taxation practices, rules of origin requirements,
subsidies and other direct and indirect means that nations use to discourage imports
or artificially stimulate or restrict exports." S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
74, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7186, 7224 (Senate bill granting
President authority to enter into trade agreements regarding nontariff barriers). See
generally Note, Guide to Import Relief and Unfair Trade Actions Available Under United States
International Trade Law, 15 INT'L LAW. 240 (1981) (discussion of various nontariff bar-
riers).
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competition from imported goods.3 The countervailing duty
3. See generally S. METZGER, supra note 2 (discussion of significant nontariff barri-
ers, including countervailing duty law). There are other United States nontariff bar-
riers, besides the countervailing duty law, which help combat unfair import competi-
tion.
The antidumping law prohibits sales of foreign goods in United States markets
at less than fair value that threaten or cause material injury to a United States indus-
try. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982). Antidumping duties are imposed in
an amount equal to the amount by which the foreign market value exceeds the
United States price for the merchandise. See id. Antidumping actions, unlike coun-
tervailing duty petitions, are brought against the action of companies or industries,
not countries. The following examples illustrate the distinction between the an-
tidumping and countervailing duty provisions:
Example 1: Singerfabrik, a German company, manufactures sewing ma-
chines. The price in Germany is $100. It sells the same machine in the
United States for $75 (after adjustment for shipping, etc.). Singer gets no
financial help from the German government in connection with the produc-
tion or export of the machines. Only the antidumping law would apply
since there is no element of subsidy.
Example 2: LaCorona, an Italian manufacturer, receives a government sub-
sidy payment equivalent to $5 for each typewriter it exports. This enables it
to sell its typewriters for $92.50 or the equivalent in both Italy and the
United States. Were it not for the subsidy, the price would be $95 in both
places. In this case, only the countervailing duty law would apply, because
although there is subsidy, there is no price discrimination.
Example 3: The Netherlands pays exporters of processed cheese an export
subsidy of 2 cents per pound. Prochesse, a Dutch company, sells processed
cheeses for 37 cents a pound in the Netherlands and 35 cents (after adjust-
ments) to the United States. A complaint could be filed with the [Commerce
Department] asking for relief under either [or both] of these laws, because
elements of both price discrimination and subsidy exist in this case, and the
added duty would, on the facts given, be the same under either law.
E. RoSSIDES, U.S. CUSTOMS, TARIFFS AND TRADE 462-63 (1977). See generallyJ. PATrI-
SON, ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAws (1984); Cuneo & Manuel, Road-
block to Trade: The State-Controlled Economy Issue in Antidumping Law Administration, 5
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 277 (1982) (application of antidumping law to nonmarket econ-
omy countries).
Section 406 of the Trade Act of 1974 provides temporary relief against imports
when a domestic industry is materially injured by increasing imports from communist
countries. Under this provision, the plaintiff does not need to show unfairness. 19
U.S.C. § 2436 (1982); see S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2nd Sess. 210, reprinted in
1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7186, 7342.
[Congress enacted section 406 because it] recognize[d] that a communist
country, through control of the distribution process and the price at which
articles are sold, could disrupt the domestic markets of its trading partners
and thereby injure producers in those countries. In particular exports from
communist countries could be directed so as to flood domestic markets
within a shorter time period than could occur under free market condi-
tion[s].
Id. Congress stated that traditional unfair trade remedies have proved ineffective,
because they are difficult to apply to products from nonmarket economies. See infra
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law levies a duty equal to the amount of any subsidy granted by
the government of an exporting country with respect to goods
imported into this country. 4 United States industries have re-
note 5 (definition of nonmarket economies). United States legislators were also mo-
tivated to support the law because they were concerned that the United States could
become dependent upon communist countries for vital raw materials. Id.; see Erlick,
Relieffrom Communist Countries. The Trials and Tribulations of Section 406, 13 LAw & PoL'Y
INT'L Bus. 617 (1981).
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 prohibits unfair methods of competition
and unfair acts in the importation of goods. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982). In practice,
almost all of the cases brought under this section of the law involve alleged patent
infringement or antitrust violations. See R. STURM, supra note 2, at § 65.3; Kaye &
Plaia, The Relationship of Countervailing Duty and Antidumping Law to Section 337 Jurisdic-
tion of the U.S. International Trade Commission, 2 INT'L TRADE L.J. 3 (1977).
The President has authority to retaliate against unfair practices of foreign gov-
ernments under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1982).
Section 301 is not a substitute for other United States statutes that address. specific
unfair trade practices. See Coffield, Using Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 as a Re-
sponse to Foreign Government Trade Actions: When, Why & How, 6 N.CJ. INr'L L. & CoM.
REG. 381 (1981). Section 301 gives the Executive the power to use economic and
diplomatic pressure to benefit United States Commerce. Id. at 382.
The President has additional power under section 201 of the Tariff Act of 1974(the "escape clause") to take remedial action to prevent severe economic injury to
domestic industries caused by a rapid or disruptive increase in imports. 19 U.S.C.
§ 2253 (1982); see S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 119, reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7186, 7263.
For many years, the Congress has required that an "escape clause" be in-
cluded in each trade agreement. The rationale for the "escape clause" has
been, and remains, that as barriers to international trade are lowered, some
industries and workers inevitably face serious injury, dislocation and per-
haps economic extinction. The "escape clause" is aimed at providing tem-
porary relief for an industry suffering from serious injury, or the threat
thereof, so that the industry will have sufficient time to adjust to the freer
international competition'.
Id.; see also, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATINAL
TRADE LAW 37 (1982) (discussion of the escape clause).
4. See Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982). "Subsidy" is defined by the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) (1982), as follows:
The term "subsidy" has the same meaning as the term "bounty or grant" as
that term is used in section 1303 of this title, and includes, but is not limited
to, the following:
(A) Any export subsidy described in Annex A to the [GATT] Agreement
(relating to illustrative list of export subsidies).
(B) The following domestic subsidies, if provided or required by govern-
ment action to a specific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or
industries, whether publicly or privately owned, and whether paid or be-
stowed directly or indirectly on the manufacture, production, or export of
any class or kind of merchandise:
(i) The provision of capital, loans, or loan guarantees on terms inconsistent
with commercial considerations.
(ii) The provision of goods or services at preferential rates.
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cently filed countervailing duty petitions seeking relief from
low-priced imports that originate in nonmarket economy coun-
tries. 5 Problems have arisen, however, in applying the coun-
(iii) The grant of funds or forgiveness of debt to cover operating losses sus-
tained by a specific industry.
(iv) The assumption of any costs or expenses of manufacture, production,
or distribution.
Id.
The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677-1 (West Supp. 1985) ad-
ded the following definition of upstream subsidies to the Trade Agreements Act of
1979:
(a) Definition. The term "upstream subsidy" means any subsidy described
in section 1677(5)(B)(i), (ii), or (iii) of this title by the government of a coun-
try that-
1) is paid or bestowed by that government with respect to a product (here-
after referred to as an "input product") that is used in the manufacture or
production in that country of merchandise which is the subject of a counter-
vailing duty proceeding;
2) in the judgment of the administering authority bestows a competitive
benefit on the merchandise; and
3) has a significant effect on the cost of manufacturing or producing the
merchandise.
Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, 19 U.S.C. § 1677-1. The terms "bounty" or "grant"
are used interchangeably with the term "subsidy" throughout this text. See 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677(5) (1982).
5. The first contervailing duty petition brought against a nonmarket economy
country was brought by members of the United States textile industry. See Textiles,
Apparel, and Related Products from the People's Republic of China, 48 Fed. Reg.
46,600 (Int'l Trade Admin. 1983) (initiation of countervailing duty investigations).
Although the petitioners ultimately withdrew their petition in this case, see infra notes
82-88 and accompanying text, several other petitions have resulted in decisions from
the United States Commerce Department. E.g., Carbon Steel Wire Rod From Czech-
oslovakia, 48 Fed. Reg. 56,419 (Int'l Trade Admin. 1984) (initiation of countervailing
duty investigation); Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland, 48 Fed. Reg. 56,419 (Int'l
Trade Admin. 1984) (initiation of countervailing duty investigation); see also infra
notes 89-128 and accompanying text (Commerce Department discussion of these
cases).
The International Trade Administration (ITA), see infra note 33 and accompany-
ing text, listed several factors to be considered in determining whether an economy
was nonmarket, including: i) state control of capital financing through controls on
internally generated funds and state control of banks; ii) state control of international
currency transactions with "hard currency" countries and officially maintained dual
exchange rate; and iii) government appointment of management, control of sectoral
development plans and capital investment. Truck Trailer Axle-and-Brake Assemblies
from Hungary, 46 Fed. Reg. 46,152 (1981); see infra note 105 (Commerce Depart-
ment definition of nonmarket economy).
Typically, the governments of nonmarket economy countries are communist.
The United States recognizes the following countries as nonmarket economy coun-
tries: Albania, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, German Democratic Repub-
lic, Hungary, Indochina, Korea, Kurile Islands, Latvia, Lithuania, Outer Mongolia,
Polish People's Republic, Southern Sakhalin, Tanna Tuva, and the Union of Soviet
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tervailing duty law to goods from nonmarket economy coun-
tries because it is difficult to identify and quantify subsidies on
such goods.6
The issue of whether the countervailing duty law can be
applied to goods from nonmarket economy countries was first
addressed by the Court of International Trade in Continental
Steel Corp. v. United States.7 The Court of International Trade
(CIT), reversing two rulings of the United States Department
of Commerce (Commerce Department), held that the Com-
merce Department erred in assuming that a subsidy can exist
only in a market economy.8 According to the CIT, the coun-
Socialist Republics. See headnote 3(0 of the Tariff Schedule of the United States
(TSUS), 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1982). The People's Republic of China, Romania, and
Yugoslavia, although not listed in the headnote, are considered nonmarket econo-
mies. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:
U.S. LAWS AND REGULATIONS APPLICABLE TO IMPORTS FROM NONMARKET ECONOMIES
COULD BE IMPROVED 1 (GAO Pub. No. ID-81-35, 1981) [hereinafter cited as COMP-
TROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT]. Yugoslavia's inclusion remains debatable. Although it
is a comunist country, it is nonetheless regarded by many as a market economy. Id.
Nonmarket economies are characterized by resources allocated by the govern-
ment, administratively set domestic prices, and nonconvertible currency. Id. at 2.
The United States has differentiated among the nonmarket economies in estab-
lishing and maintaining trade and economic relations. For example, the United
States now extends most-favored-nation tariff treatment to products imported from
Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Romania, and the People's Republic of China, but not
to products from other nonmarket countries, such as the Soviet Union. Id. at 3.
Most-favored-nation treatment is a commitment by one country that it will extend to
another country the lowest tariff rates it applies to imports from any third country.
The Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan resulted in a partial United States em-
bargo of goods from that country. Id. at 3; see Metzger, Most-Favored Nation Treatment
of Imports to the U.S. from the U.S.S.R., 1 Ir'r'L TRADE L.J. 79 (1975).
6. See infra notes 101-15 and accompanying text (discussion of Commerce De-
partment's explanation of difficulty of applying countervailing duty law); infra note
143 and accompanying text (discussion of Court of International Trade's explanation
of difficulty of applying the countervailing duty law).
7. Continental Steel Corp. v. United States, 614 F. Supp. 548 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1985), appeal docketed, No. 85-2805 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 24, 1985). Three actions were
consolidated in this case: Georgetown Steel and Continental Steel sought review in
the CIT of the Commerce Department's negative countervailing duty determination
in the cases involving carbon steel wire rod from Czechoslovakia, 49 Fed. Reg.
19,370, and Poland, 49 Fed. Reg. 19,374. Amax Chemical and Kerr-McGee sought
to review the dismissal of their petitions in the cases of potash imported from the
Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,428. See infra
notes 129-148 and accompanying text (discussion of court's reversal of Commerce
Department). The Court of International Trade has exclusive jurisdiction in any ac-
tion brought under 19 U.S.C. § 1516(a) (1982), which includes actions appealing a
ruling by the Commerce Department. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (1982).
8. Continental Steel, 614 F. Supp. at 550.
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tervailing duty law was intended to apply to all countries, re-
gardless of their economic systems. 9 The Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit has recently reversed the CIT and upheld
the Commerce Department's determination that the counter-
vailing duty law does not apply to imports from nonmarket
economy countries.' 0
This Note will examine the applicability of the counter-
vailing duty law to nonmarket economies. Part I will review
the legislative history of the countervailing duty statute and its
judicial and administrative interpretations." Part II will dis-
cuss the Commerce Department rulings, the Court of Interna-
tional Trade's reversal of these rulings in Continental Steel Corp.
v. United States and the Federal Circuit's reversal of the CIT.' 2
Finally, Part III will analyze both approaches to the issue.' 3
This Note will conclude that the countervailing duty law
should apply to goods from nonmarket economies. 14
I. HISTORY OF THE COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAW
The encouragement of exports through government sub-
sidies has long been recognized as a threat to the natural and
efficient allocation of resources in international trade. 15 The
United States has dealt with this problem through the use of a
9. Id. at 551.
10. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, No. 85-2805 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 18,
1986). Continental Steel does not appear as a party in this court. For purposes of
this note, however, both cases will be referred to as Continental Steel. The Federal
Circuit vacated the order of the CIT in the Polish and Czechoslovakian wire rod case
and the case was remanded to the CIT to dismiss the complaint for lack ofjurisdic-
tion because the complaint was not timely filed. The Federal Circuit reversed the
CIT insofar as it set aside the Commerce Department's final actions in the Soviet
Union and German Democratic Republic potash cases.
11. See infra notes 15-81 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 82-152 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 153-200 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 201-24 and accompanying text.
15. S. METZGER, supra note 2, at 101. As early as 1776, commentators con-
demned the use of bounties as an artificial stimulation of exports. 1 A. SMITH, AN
INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 506 (R. Campbell
& C. Skinner eds. 1976). "The effect of bounties, like that of all the other expedients
of the mercantile system, can only be to force the trade of a country into a channel
much less advantageous than that in which it would naturally run of its own accord."
Id. (footnote omitted). Subsidies are seen as distortions of international trade be-
cause the exporter receiving assistance is more competitive in the world market as a
result of its product's subsidization, not because of its more efficient production. See
Butler, Countervailing Duties and Export Subsidization: A Re-emerging Issue in International
1986]
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countervailing duty law since 1890.16
A. Relevant Legislative History
The United States adopted its first general countervailing
duty law as part of the Tariff Act of 1897.17 That Act author-
ized the United States Treasury Department to apply counter-
vailing duties on any imported, dutiable' 8 product that had re-
ceived a bounty or grant from the government of the exporting
state. 9 The Tariff Act of 1922 (1922 Act)2" substantially en-
larged the scope of the countervailing duty law to cover boun-
ties or grants bestowed upon the manufacture or production of
goods, as well as on their exportation.2' The 1922 Act also
broadened the law to include subsidies paid by nongovern-
mental sources.2 2 The present countervailing duty law is
Trade, 9 VA. J. INT'L L. 82, 83 (1969); Schwartz & Harper, The Regulation of Subsidies
Affecting International Trade, 70 MICH. L. REV. 831, 840 (1972).
16. See McKinley Tariff Act, ch. 1244, § 1, para. 237, 26 Stat. 567, 584 (1890).
Congress enacted the world's first countervailing duty law in 1890, after extensive
debate concerning protection of the United States sugar industry from highly subsi-
dized European competitors. See H. KAYE, P. PLAIA & M. HERTZBERG, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE PRACTICE § 13.04 (1981). Congress has the primary and ultimate power to
"lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises" and "to regulate Commerce
with foreign nations." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1,3.
17. Tariff Act of 1897, ch. 11, § 5, 30 Stat. 151, 205 (1897).
18. Importers must pay countervailing duties in addition to any other duties im-
posed on the imported merchandise. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (1982). The original coun-
tervailing duty law did not apply to duty-free merchandise. The Trade Act of 1974
amended the law to include duty-free merchandise. Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat.
1978, 2049 (1974).
19. Tariff Act of 1897, ch. 11, § 5, 30 Stat. 151, 205 (1897).
20. Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 303, 42 Stat. 858, 935-36 (1922).
21. Id. Export subsidies are defined as those grants paid by the foreign govern-
ment upon export. See Barcelo, Subsidies, Countervailing Duties and Antidumping After the
Tokyo Round, 13 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 257, 261 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Barcelo I];
Barcelo, Subsidies and Countervailing Duties-Analysis and a Proposal, 9 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 779, 780-81 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Barcelo II]. Manufacture or production
bounties are domestic subsidies paid by the foreign government without respect to
the ultimate destination of the end product. See Barcelo I, supra, at 261; Barcelo II,
supra, at 780.
22. TariffAct of 1922, ch. 356, § 303, 42 Stat. 858, 935-36 (1922). A nongover-
mental source includes a "person, partnership, association, cartel, or corporation."
Id. To date, however, all of the Commerce Department's countervailing duty deter-
minations have arisen from the actions of a foreign government, rather than from the
actions of a private foreign organization. See Countervailing Duties [Reference File], U.S.
IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA), 40:0103 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Countervailing Duties].
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found in section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930.23
The Trade Act of 197424 provided for United States par-
ticipation in the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions (Tokyo Round),25 which had as its main goal the reduc-
23. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, tit. III, § 303, 46 Stat. 590, 687 (codified at 19
U.S.C. § 1303 (1983)).
24. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1974). Two provi-
sions of the 1974 Act address the issue of unfair imports from nonmarket economies.
Section 406 of the 1974 Act allows the President of the United States to invoke im-
port relief whenever imports from a communist country cause "market disruption."
Id. tit. 4, § 406, 88 Stat. 1978, 2062 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2436 (1982)); see supra
note 3. Congress also amended the antidumping law in the 1974 Act to make it
easier to apply to nonmarket economy countries. The antidumping law will apply
when the exporting nation is selling goods abroad at a price lower than in its home
market, thereby materially injuring a United States industry. Id. Before the 1974 Act
revisions, the law was hard to apply because it was difficult to determine the home
market price in a nonmarket economy. See S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
174, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7186, 7311.
The Committee is concerned that the technical rules contained in the Act
are insufficient to counteract dumping from State-controlled-economy
countries where the supply and demand forces do not operate to produce
prices, either in the home market or in third countries, which can be relied
upon for comparison purposes.
Id. The 1974 Act attempts to solve the problem by adopting a standard for price
comparison. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, tit. 3, § 204(c), 88 Stat. 1978,
2047 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b (1982)):
(c) State-controlled economies
If available information indicates to the administering authority that the
economy of the country from which the merchandise is exported is State-
controlled to an extent that sales or offers of sales of such or similar mer-
chandise in that country or to countries other than the United States do not
permit a determination of foreign market value under subsection (a) of this
section, the administering authority shall determine the foreign market
value of the merchandise on the basis of the normal costs, expenses, and
profits as reflected by either-
(1) the prices, determined in accordance with subsection (a) of this section,
at which such or similar merchandise of a non-State-controlled economy
country or countries is sold either-
(A) for consumption in the home market of that country or countries, or
(B) to other countries, including the United States; or
(2) the constructed value of such or similar merchandise in a non-State-con-
trolled-economy country or countries as determined under subsection (e) of
this section.
19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c). The 1974 Act also authorizes the President, subject to con-
gressional approval, to negotiate tariff modifications and reductions in nontariff bar-
riers, including countervailing duties. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 203,
88 Stat. 1978, 2015 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2253 (1985)); see supra note 3.
25. The Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations [hereinafter cited as
the Tokyo Round] was the seventh round of negotiations held by signatories to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S.
AA
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tion or elimination of tariff and nontariff barriers to trade.26 At
the Tokyo Round, the participants drafted a Subsidies Code27
that provides detailed rules for the application of antisubsidy
principles and sanctions underlying the General Agreement on
Trade and Tariffs (GATT).28
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (1979 Act) revised the
countervailing duty law to comply with the United States obli-
gations under the Subsidies Code.29 One of the major revi-
sions of the law was the addition of a requirement that domes-
tic industries prove that they are being materially injured by
imports from countries that have signed the Subsidies Code or
assumed equivalent obligations. 30  Because no nonmarket
economy country has assumed the obligations of the Subsidies
Code, imports from these countries do not receive the benefit
of the material injury test.3 ' In addition, the Congress defined
No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter cited as GATT]. GATT is an international
document that was negotiated in 1947 by 23 trading nations for the purpose of estab-
lishing "reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substan-
tial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discrimi-
natory treatment in international commerce." GATT, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 196. Con-
ducted in Geneva, Switzerland, between 1973 and 1979, the Tokyo Round's goal was
to continue the liberalization of world trade that began with GATT. The Tokyo
Round's most important accomplishment was a series of international agreements
limiting the use and growth of nontariff measures. See H. KAYE, P. PLAIA & M. HERTZ-
BERG, supra note 16, at § 13.02 n.3; R. STURM, supra note 2, at § 62; Note, Technical
Analysis of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement, 11 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
1497 (1979).
26. See 0. LONG, THE TOKYO ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS-
REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF GATT 1 (1979). "The negotiations on a wide
range of non-tariff measures were what most distinguished the Tokyo Round from
earlier GATT multilateral negotiations." Id. at 49.
27. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Interpretation and Application of
Articles VI, XVI, XXIII, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S. No. 9619 [hereinafter
cited as Subsidies Code]. See generally Rivers & Greenwald, The Negotiation of a Code on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: Bridging Fundamental Policy Differences, 11 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1447 (1979) (discussion of deliberations leading to enactment of
Subsidies Code).
28. See Subsidies Code, supra note 27.
29. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, tit. 1, §§ 701-707, 93
Stat. 144, 151-62 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1671b (1982 & Supp. 1 1983)). Congress
adopted the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 to "make necessary and appropriate
changes in United States law to implement the results of the Tokyo Round of Multi-
lateral Trade Negotiations (MTN)." S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, re-
printed in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 381.
30. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, tit. 1, § 701, 93 Stat. 144,
151 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1671b (1982 & Supp. 1 1983)).
31. Id. Office of the United States Trade Representative, International Agree-
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subsidies for the first time in the 1979 Act, incorporating part
of the Subsidies Code definition.32
B. The Administrative Review Procedure and the
Commerce Department's Interpretation of the
Countervailing Duty Law
1. Overview
The Secretary of Commerce administers the counter-
vailing duty law under the supervision of the administering
agency, the International Trade Administration.3 3 The Secre-
tary of Commerce may initiate a countervailing duty investiga-
tion, 4 but such investigations are most commonly initiated by
a petition from an interested party35 who has reason to believe
ments and Arrangements Concluded During Tokyo Round, Status of Acceptances
(Oct. 1, 1985) (memorandum providing the current status of acceptances of the
nontariff measure codes and international arrangements negotiated during the To-
kyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations) (available at the Fordham International
Law Journal). The following countries have signed and ratified the Subsidies Code:
Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Egypt, European Economic Community (for Member
States), Finland, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Korea, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United States,
and Uruguay. See id.
The People's Republic of China is reportedly seeking GATT status again, after a
36 year absence, which indicates that it may be considering signing the Subsidies
Code. China Seeking GATT Status, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1986, at D6, col. 3.
32. See supra note 4; see also S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 84-85, re-
printed in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 470-71 (legislative purpose in defining
subsidy).
33. 19 U.S.C. § 1303(b) (1982). This section provides that the countervailing
duty "shall be imposed, under regulations prescribed by the administering author-
ity" as defined in 19 U.S.C. § 1677(1). Id. "The term 'administering authority' means
the Secretary of the Treasury, or any other officer of the United States to whom the
responsibility for carrying out the duties of the administering authority under this
subtitle are transferred by law." 19 U.S.C. § 1677(1).
Authority to administer the countervailing duty law was transferred from the
Secretary of the Treasury to the Secretary of Commerce, effective January 2, 1980.
Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 69,273, 69,274 (1979). The exer-
cise of that authority is under the general supervision of the Under Secretary for
International Trade and the immediate supervision of the Assistant Secretary for
Trade Administration who, through the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Import Ad-
ministration, supervises the administering agency, the International Trade Adminis-
tration (I.T.A.). See Countervailing Duties, supra note 22, at 40:0102. For information
on how to file a countervailing duty petition, see id. at 40:0107-0120. See generally
deKieffer, When, Why and How to Bring a Countervailing Duty Proceeding: A Complainant's
Perspective, 6 N.C.J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 363 (1980-81).
34. 19 C.F.R. § 355.25 (1985).
35. See infra note 64 (definition of interested party); 19 U.S.C. § 1677(9)(a).
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that a subsidy is being provided with respect to merchandise
imported into the United States.36
The petition must contain specified information, to the ex-
tent that it is reasonably available. 7 The requirements include
a detailed description of the imported merchandise, 38 its coun-
try of exportation,3 9 the identities of the benefiting foreign en-
terprises,40 the foreign statutory or other authority under
which the subsidy is provided,4 the manner in which the sub-
sidy is paid, and the value of such subsidy when received and
used by producers or sellers of the merchandise.42 The peti-
tion should also contain information respecting sales prices by
foreign manufacturers, producers, or exporters to the United
States during the period to be investigated.43 In addition, the
petition should give the quantity and value of the goods im-
ported into the United States in the most recent two-year pe-
riod.44
Within twenty days after a petition is filed, the Secretary of
Commerce must rule on the sufficiency of the petition.4 5 If the
petition properly alleges a basis upon which a countervailing
duty may be imposed, a notice of "Initiation of Countervailing
Duty Investigation" will be published in the Federal Register.46
The Secretary of Commerce will make a preliminary determi-
nation within eighty-five days of the filing of a petition, and will
base the decision on the best information available at the
time.4 7 Within seventy-five days of the date of a preliminary
determination, the Secretary of Commerce will make a final de-
termination.48
If the Secretary finds that a subsidy has been provided, he
will publish a countervailing duty order. 49 The countervailing
36. 19 C.F.R. § 355.26 (1985).
37. Id.
38. Id. § 355.26(4).
39. Id. § 355.26(5).
40. Id. § 355.26(6).
41. Id. § 355.26(7).
42. Id.
43. Id. § 355.26(8).
44. Id. § 355.26(9).
45. Id. § 355.27.
46. Id. § 355.27(b).
47. Id. § 355.28.
48. Id. § 355.33.
49. Id. § 355.36.
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duty order directs customs officers to assess a countervailing
duty on the merchandise found to be benefiting from the sub-
sidy.50 At least once a year, the International Trade Adminis-
tration assesses the amount of the net subsidy.5'
2. Administrative Analysis: Identifying and
Quantifying Subsidies
The Commerce Department has a twofold task in a coun-
tervailing duty investigation. First, it must determine whether
a subsidy exists,52 and, second, estimate the amount of the net
subsidy.5" The Commerce Department can refer to the illus-
trative list of subsidies set forth in the Tariff Act of 1979 for
guidance in identifying subsidies.5 4 In evaluating what consti-
tutes a bounty or grant, it also reviews past policies and deci-
sions and the wide variety of foreign governmental actions that
it has identified as bounties or grants.55 These governmental
actions have included a package of payments and benefits
made to a company as an inducement to build plants, including
accelerated depreciation under the income tax laws, low-inter-
est loans, and property tax concessions, 6 cash payments to
fishermen for financing vessel, wharf, and storage area con-
struction,57 and a favorable interest rate program for plant
modernization, freight rate subsidies assistance, and milk price
58support payments.
Once a subsidy is identified, its amount often proves diffi-
cult to determine.59 The commercial and competitive advan-
50. Id. § 355.36(a).
51. Id. § 355.41.
52. 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982).
53. Id.
54. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, tit. I, § 771(5), 93 Stat.
176 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) (1982)); see supra note 4 (illustrative list of subsi-
dies).
55. See S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 84, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 470. "'The definition of 'subsidy' is intended to clarify that the
term has the same meaning which administrative practice and the courts have
ascribed to the term 'bounty or grant' under section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930,
unless that practice or interpretation is inconsistent with the bill." Id.
56. X-Radial Steel Belted Tires from Canada, T.D. 73-10, 7 Cust. B. & Dec. 24
(1973).
57. Certain Fish from Canada, T.D. 78-181, 12 Cust. B. & Dec. 386 (1978).
58. Cheese from Finland, T.D. 76-173, 10 Cust. B. & Dec. 305 (1976).
59. SeeJ. PArrISON, supra note 3, at 6-20 (1984). The amount of countervailing
duty levied by the Commerce Department is limited to the amount of net subsidy
19861
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tage received by the foreign firm is the basic standard used in
calculating the amount of the subsidy.60 For example, if the
alleged subsidy is the extension of a preferential loan rate by a
government, the Commerce Department will find a subsidy in
the amount of the benefit conferred by the lower rate, dis-
counted to present value if necessary. 6' However, in certain
circumstances, the calculation of a subsidy is not so straightfor-
ward. Quantification problems have arisen, for example, when
a subsidy applies to several products only one of which is
under investigation.62
C. Judicial Interpretation of the Statutory Language
The Court of International Trade has exclusive jurisdic-
tion over actions brought to contest final countervailing duty
determinations by the Commerce Department. 63 Such an ac-
tion may be brought by an "interested party" who was a party
to the administrative proceeding. 64 Judicial review is based on
the record made before the administrative agency.65 Upon re-
given by the foreign government to the exporter or producer. 19 U.S.C. § 167 1(a);
see 19 U.S.C. § 1677(6) (definition of net subsidy). The Commerce Department de-
clines import relief when an investigation reveals that the alleged subsidy is de
minimis. J. PA'rrisoN, supra note 3, at 6-23.
60. See S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 85-86, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 471-72. The Commerce Department summarized the quantifica-
tion process in its preliminary determination in Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland,
49 Fed. Reg. 6,768, 6,769 (1984), as follows:
If an industry or industry group is treated preferentially, we need to quantify
any benefit conferred. In our countervailing duty cases to date-which have
all involved products from market economies-we have used prices or costs
to calculate benefits. In market economies, government subsidies generally
cause changes in prices facing a firm-the prices paid for goods or services
purchased, or the prices received for the sale of a product. In our investiga-
tions, we usually seek the price the firm would have paid or received absent
government intervention or preferentiality. Any difference between the
"benchmark" price, based on operation of a market, and what the firm pays
or receives as a result of the government intervention is a subsidy.
Id.
61. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B)(i) (1982); see, e.g.,J. PATrisoN, supra note 3, at 6-34
n.l; Certain Steel Products from Belgium, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,304, 39,307-308 (1982).
62. SeeJ. PA'riSON, supra note 3, at 6-24.
63. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (1982).
64. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(9) (1982). "Interested part[ies]" may include foreign
manufacturers, United States manufacturers, foreign governments, certain unions,
certain trade associations, United States importers and foreign exporters. Id.
65. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (1982); see S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 251-52
(1979).
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view, the CIT must determine whether the disputed determi-
nation is unsupported by substantial evidence or otherwise not
in accordance with the law.66
Through the years, United States courts have interpreted
the phrase "bounty or grant," as used in section 303 of the
Tariff Act of 1930, to include a number of governmental pro-
grams. 67 Generally, the courts have advocated a broad reading
of the terms "bounty" or "grant" to accord with the congres-
sional purpose of "assuring effective protection of domestic in-
terests from foreign subsidies. ' 68 These courts have held the
following to be countervailable bounties or grants: remissions
of domestic taxes, 69 an allowance paid upon exportation, 70 a
system of currency control designed so that exporters can
meet foreign competition, 7' preferential rail freight rates, 72
and a program giving loans at a preferential interest rate, in
which the first seven repayments are deferred and a special
municipal tax arrangement is provided.73
The Court of International Trade has also interpreted the
"bounty or grant" language of section 303. In Bethlehem Steel
Corp. v. United States 74 the CIT affirmed its broad reading of the
law and rejected the International Trade Administration's view
that, as a rule, domestic programs generally available to all in-
dustries are not subsidies.75 According to the CIT, the extent
to which subsidization is practiced in the country of production
66. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b).
67. See 2 R. STURM, supra note 2, at § 58.2 (1985).
68. See, e.g., A.S.G. Industries, Inc. v. United States, 610 F.2d 770, 776 (C.C.P.A.
1980) (citing S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 183 (1974)); Nicholas & Co. v.
United States, 249 U.S. 34, 39 (1919).
69. See American Express Co. v. United States, 472 F.2d 1050 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
70. Nicholas & Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 34 (1919).
71. Robert E. Miller & Co. v. United States, 34 C.C.P.A. 101, C.A.D. 349 (1946);
F.W. Woolworth Co. v. United States, 115 F.2d 348 (C.C.P.A. 1940).
72. Macalloy Corp. v. United States, 1 Ct. Int'l Trade 199 (1981).
73. Michelin Tire Corp. v. United States, 2 Ct. Int'l Trade 143 (1981).
74. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States, 590 F. Supp. 1237 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1984).
75. Id. at 1239. The court's opinion reads in part:
The practice at issue was one in which companies (whose employee training
programs were certified by the South African Department of Manpower)
were allowed to deduct 200 percent of the expenses of the training program
from their taxable income. The I.T.A. found that this practice was not a
bounty or grant because of 'the general availability of this tax benefit.'
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is entirely immaterial.76
In Cabot Corp. v. United States,77 the Court of International
Trade clarified its position on generally available benefits. The
CIT noted that "generalized benefits" provided by a govern-
ment, such as national defense or education benefits that ac-
crue generally to all citizens as well as enterprises, are not
countervailable bounties or grants. 78  However, "generally
available" benefits, that may be obtained by any and all enter-
prises, when actually bestowed may constitute grants to indi-
vidual enterprises. 79 Therefore, if the "generally available"
benefit amounts to an additional benefit or competitive advan-
tage, it is countervailable.8 0 The Commerce Department, how-
ever, has rejected the Court of International Trade's broad ap-
proach and has continued to hold that generally available pro-
grams like those at issue in Bethlehem Steel and Cabot are not
countervailable. 81
II. CONTINENTAL STEEL CORP. v. UNITED STATES
A countervailing duty petition brought by the United
States steel industry gave the Commerce Department, the
Court of International Trade and the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit their first chance to decide whether the coun-
tervailing duty law applies to goods from nonmarket econo-
mies.
76. Id. at 1241. "A law created to deal with the advantageous effects of such
benefits as are enjoyed by imports to be sold in the U.S. is hardly concerned with
whether the challenged imports are the only beneficiaries or just one of many." Id. at
1242. The court's opinion forecast the Continental Steel decision, which held that
goods from nonmarket economy countries are not exempt from the countervailing
duty law. See infra notes 129-47 and accompanying text (discussion of Continental Steel
decision).
77. 19 Cust. B. & Dec. 11 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
78. Id. at 19.
79. Id. For example, although the government may make low interest rates on
loans available to all industries building new plants, only those industries building
new plants will benefit from the grant. Thus the implementation of the subsidy re-
sults in a special bestowal upon specific enterprises and is therefore countervailable.
80. Id. at 19.
81. See, e.g., Certain Refrigeration Compressors from Singapore, 50 Fed. Reg.
30,493, 30,494 (1985) ("[w]e do not consider generally available programs to be
countervailable... [t]he court's.., comments in Bethlehem Steel on general availa-
bility are dicta").
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A. Commerce Department Rulings
In September 1983, the Commerce Department first for-
mally addressed the issue of whether a subsidy can be found in
a nonmarket economy when United States textile and apparel
interests82 filed a countervailing duty petition against products
from the People's Republic of China (PRC).83 The subsidy al-
leged in the petition was the PRC's dual exchange rate system,
in which a one yuan conversion rate is offered to producers of
non-export goods, and another more generous rate is offered
to producers of certain export goods.8 4 The Commerce De-
partment initiated "novel" issue hearings to consider the ap-
plicability of the United States countervailing duty law to
nonmarket economy countries.8 - The issue became moot,
however, when the Commerce Department convinced the tex-
tile and apparel coalition to withdraw its petition, pending po-
tential changes in United States textile trade policy. 86 In De-
82. The countervailing duty petition was filed by the American Textile Manufac-
turer Institute, the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, and the Inter-
national Ladies Garments Workers Union. It was later amended to include the
American Apparel Manufacturers Association. See Textiles, Apparel & Related Prod-
ucts from People's Republic of China, 48 Fed. Reg. 46,600 (Int'l Trade Admin. 1983)
(initiation of countervailing duty investigation).
83. See id.
84. See Textile Coalition Charges Subsidization by Chinese of Textile, Apparel Goods, 8
U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 23, at 878 (Sept. 14, 1983). Under the system an
"internal settlement rate" allows Chinese exporters to exchange each dollar earned
for 2.8 yuan, whereas the official rate is approximately 1.9 yuan to the dollar, accord-
ing to the petition. Id.
85. 48 Fed. Reg. 46,092 (1983). The Commerce Department scheduled the spe-
cial conference to discuss the "novel" issue: "Whether under the Tariff Act of 1930,
as amended, bounties or grants may be found in a non-market economy country..."
Id. The countervailing duty petition was the first ever filed against a nonmarket econ-
omy country. See Applicability of Laws to Nonmarket Economies Discussed at Commerce Hear-
ing, 9 U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 6, at 226 (Nov. 9 1983) (statement by Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Import Administration Alan F. Holmer). For a summary of
the arguments that were presented to the Commerce Department at the hearing on
the issue above, see Note, Countervailing Duties and Non-Market Economies: The Case of the
Peoples Republic of China, 10 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 405 (1983).
86. See Industry, Commerce Agree to Delay Decision on Chinese Textiles CVD Case, 9 U.S.
IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 10, at 373 (Dec. 7, 1983).
The termination of the investigation followed an announcement from Pe-
king that the country would purchase an additional 2 million tons of U.S.
grain to meet its obligations under an existing bilateral grain pact. China
embargoed U.S. wheat and soybean imports from the United States in retali-
ation for not coming to an agreement on a new bilateral textile agreement.
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cember 1983, the President announced a significant tightening
of the United States system of restrictions on imports and tex-
tiles and apparel products.87 The issue was, therefore, left un-
resolved.88
The United States steel industry provided the Commerce
Department its first opportunity to decide whether certain
practices by a nonmarket economy country constitute the
awarding of bounties or grants. In November 1983, four
United States steel producers89 filed a petition on behalf of the
carbon steel wire rod industry90 alleging that manufacturers,
producers, or exporters in Czechoslovakia and Poland received
direct or indirect benefits. 9 In the following month, the Com-
merce Department initiated an investigation based on those al-
legations .92
87. See White House Announces Specific Criteria for Limiting Textile, Apparel Imports, 9
U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 12, at 457 (Dec. 21, 1983). The President's plan
provided additional criteria to be used to determine a "presumption of market dis-
ruption or threat thereof." Id.
88. The textile and apparel coalition did not reinstate its countervailing duty
petition. Textiles, Apparel & Related Products from People's Republic of China, 48
Fed. Reg. 55,492 (Int'l Trade Admin. 1983) (termination of countervailing duty in-
vestigations).
89. The industry coalition consisted of Atlantic Steel Company, Continental
Steel Company, Georgetown Steel Corporation, and Raritan River Steel Company.
See Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland, 48 Fed. Reg. 56,419 (Int'l Trade Admin.
1983) (initiation of countervailing duty investigation); Carbon Steel Wire Rod from
Czechoslovakia, 48 Fed. Reg. 56,419 (Int'l Trade Admin. 1983) (initiation of coun-
tervailing duty investigation). These two investigations proceeded simultaneously.
The decisions in each stage were virtually identical and appear consecutively in the
Federal Register. Hereinafter citation will only be made to Carbon Steel Wire Rod
from Poland in referring to these two investigations.
90. Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland, supra note 89, at 56,419. The steel
producers filed the petition on behalf of all United States carbon steel wire rod pro-
ducers.
'[C]arbon steel wire rod' covers a coiled, semi-finished, hot-rolled carbon
steel product of approximately round solid cross-section, not under 0.20
inch nor over 0.74 inch in diameter, not tempered, not treated, not partly
manufactured; and valued over 4 cents per pound, as currently provided for
in item 607.17 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States.
Id. at 56,420.
91. Id. In this instance, the court applied 19 U.S.C. § 1303, because neither Po-
land nor Czechoslovakia has signed the Subsidies Code. Id.; see supra note 31 (list of
countries that have signed Subsidies Code).
92. See Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland, supra note 89, at 56,419.
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1. The Commerce Department's Preliminary Carbon Steel
Wire Rod Determination
In February 1984, the Commerce Department issued its
preliminary determination that Congress did not exempt
nonmarket economy countries from the countervailing duty
law.9" The Commerce Department focused on the language of
the statute noting that, by its terms, section 303 applies to "any
country, dependency, colony, province or other political subdi-
vision of government."9 4 However, it also found that the gov-
ernment actions in question did not constitute bounties or
grants. 95 Specifically, the Commerce Department found that a
multiple exchange rate system, 96 a currency retention pro-
gram,97 price equalization payments to foreign trade organiza-
tions,98 adjustment and conversion coefficients that increase
the effective exchange rate,99 and a tax exemption for foreign
trade earnings were not bounties or grants.100
2. The Commerce Department's Final Determination
Several months later, the Commerce Department reversed
its preliminary ruling and decided that bounties or grants can-
not be identified in nonmarket economies.' In reaching its
93. See Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland, 49 Fed. Reg. 6,768 (Int'l Trade
Admin. 1984) (preliminary negative countervailing duty determination) [hereinafter
cited as Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland II].
94. Id. at 6,769; see 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (countervailing duty statute).
95. Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland II, supra note 93, at 6,770.
96. Id. at 6,768. Petitioners alleged that a multiple exchange rate system existed
whereby "different rates are applied to 1) commercial transactions with capitalist
countries, 2) commercial transactions with socialist countries, and 3) non-commercial
transactions and tourism." Id.
97. Id. Petitioners specifically alleged a currency retention program that allowed
exporting companies to keep a certain portion of their hard currency export earn-
ings. Id.
98. Id. at 6,769. Petitioners alleged that foreign trade organizations and the in-
dustrial enterprises involved in foreign trade were compensated for losses incurred
when the Foreign Trade Ministry sold goods for less than their domestic price. Id.
99. Id. Petitioners alleged adjustment coefficients existed. See id. at 6,773.
100. Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Czechoslovakia, 49 Fed. Reg. 6,773 (Int'l
Trade Admin. 1984) (preliminary negative countervailing duty determination). Peti-
tioners alleged that tax exemption of foreign trade earnings existed in Czechoslova-
kia. Id.
101. Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland, 49 Fed. Reg. 19,374 (Int'l Trade Ad-
min. 1984) (final negative countervailing duty determination) [hereinafter cited as
Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland III]. The Commerce Department reaffirmed
this decision shortly thereafter when it refused to investigate allegations of subsidiza-
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conclusion, the Commerce Department shifted its focus from
the statutory wording that the countervailing duty law applies
to "any country, dependency, colony, province or other polit-
ical subdivision,"'' 0 2 and its consideration of whether any polit-
ical entity is exempted per se from the countervailing duty law,
to consideration of whether government activities in a
nonmarket economy confer a bounty or grant within the mean-
ing of section 303.103
The Commerce Department defined a subsidy as any ac-
tion that distorts or subverts the market process and results in
a misallocation of resources, inefficient production, and re-
duced world wealth.'0 4 It described a nonmarket economy as
one in which allocation of resources is achieved by central
planning, not supply and demand, and in which there is, there-
fore, no market process to distort or subvert. 10 5 Thus, under
the Commerce Department's definition, incentives in a
nonmarket economy are imposed upon a system that is not
"economically rational" by market standards. 0 6 The Com-
merce Department reasoned that, because subsidies are mea-
sured by the difference between the market price a firm would
receive absent government intervention and the price a firm
receives with the preferential governmental treatment, identifi-
cation of a bounty or grant in a nonmarket economy would be
impossible. 107
The Commerce Department concluded that because a
supply and demand economy is a necessary reference point for
identifying and calculating the amount of subsidy, bounty, or
grant, the countervailing duty law does not apply in a state-
controlled economy.'0 8 The Commerce Department main-
tained that to impose the concept of a subsidy when it has no
tion of potash from several nonmarket economy countries. Potassium Chloride from
the German Democratic Republic, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,428 (1984) (rescission of initia-
tion of countervailing duty investigation and dismissal of petition); Potassium Chlo-
ride from the Soviet Union, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,428 (1984) (rescission of initiation of
countervailing duty investigation and dismissal of petition).
102. 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982).
103. Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland III, supra note 101, at 19,375.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 19,377.
107. Id. at 19,375.
108. Id. at 19,376. The Commerce Department defines demand as "the prices
that consumers are willing to pay for the good." Id.
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meaning would force it to identify every government action as
a subsidy.'" 9
According to the Commerce Department, the grant of a
relative advantage by a foreign government to one of its do-
mestic industries determines whether that government has
awarded a bounty or grant.' 0 The Commerce Department il-
lustrated this point by example."' If a market economy pro-
ducer were given a government payment on each of its sales,
theoretically the producer would respond by increasing out-
put.1 2 However, according to the Commerce Department, if a
nonmarket economy producer were given a similar benefit, for
example, a government increase of the controlled price, the
higher price would not necessarily increase the output of the
nonmarket economy producer." 3 This result is possible be-
cause the government may control the raw materials the pro-
ducer needs to increase production." 4 If the government de-
nies the producer access to needed raw materials, the producer
could not increase his production, even though the govern-
ment allowed him to charge a higher price."
5
To further support its determination that the counter-
vailing duty law does not apply to goods from nonmarket
economy countries, the Commerce Department noted that
Congress has been silent on the issue." 6 The Commerce De-
partment observed that, in the 1974 Act, Congress specifically
addressed the problem of unfair trade remedies with respect to
imports from nonmarket economies, but chose vehicles other
than the countervailing duty law to regulate the problem." 7
First, Congress amended section 205 of the Antidumping Act
of 19211 8 by adopting a standard for price comparison." 9
109. Id.
110. Id. "Neither form nor nomenclature being decisive in determining whether
a bounty or grant has been conferred, it is the economic result of the foreign govern-
ment's action which controls .... Id. (citing United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 64






116. Id. at 19,378.
117. Id. at 19,377.
118. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 204(c), 88 Stat. 1978, 2047 (codi-
fied at 19 U.S.C. § 167b(c) (1982)).
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Second, Congress enacted section 406 of the 1974 Act to pro-
tect United States industries from trade disruption caused by
imports from communist countries. 2 ' The Commerce De-
partment also noted that, although the countervailing duty law
was restructured in the 1979 Act, Congress did not enact a
provision that referred to nonmarket economies.12 1
The Commerce Department also cited article 15 of the
Subsidies Code 122 as evidence of congressional intent to not
apply the countervailing duty law to nonmarket economies. 23
Article 15 permits signatories to regulate unfairly priced im-
ports from nonmarket economies under either antidumping or
countervailing duty legislation. 124 The Commerce Department
claimed that, by approving article 15, Congress reaffirmed its
decision to regulate unfair competition from nonmarket econ-
omy countries under the antidumping law. 125 In contrast, the
Commerce Department noted, Congress made no effort to
amend the countervailing duty law. 126
In addition, the Commerce Department referred to recent
government and academic literature that discussed the diffi-
culty of applying the countervailing duty law to nonmarket
economy countries. 27  Finally, the Commerce Department
claimed for itself broad discretion in determining whether a
bounty or grant exists.' 28
B. Decision of the Court of International Trade
The Court of International Trade reversed the Commerce
119. Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland III, supra note 101, at 19,377; see infra
note 3 and accompanying text.
120. Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland III, supra note 101, at 19,377; see infra
note 3 and accompanying text.
121. Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland III, supra note 101, at 19,377.
122. Id. at 19,378; see Subsidies Code, supra note 27, at art. 15.
123. Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland III, supra note 101, at 19,378.
124. See Subsidies Code, supra note 27, at art. 15.
125. Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland III, supra note 101, at 19,378.
126. Id.
127. See id. The following sources were cited by the Commerce Department:
INTERFACE Two, (D. WallaceJr. & D.A. Flores, eds. 1982); INTERNATIONAL ORDER FOR
PUBLIC SUBSIDIES (Trade Policy Research Centre 1977); Barcelo, Subsidies and Counter-
vailing Duties-Analysis andA Proposal, 9 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 779, 850 (1977); RE-
PORT TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES: U.S. LAws AND REGULATIONS APPLI-
CABLE TO IMPORTS FROM NONMARKET ECONOMIES COULD BE IMPROVED (1981).
128. Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland III, supra note 101, at 19,378.
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Department's decision and held that countervailing duties may
be applied to imports from nonmarket economies. 29 In re-
viewing the Commerce Department's decision, the CIT dis-
cussed the definition of a subsidy, the plain meaning and reme-
dial purpose of the countervailing duty law, the problem of
identification and quantification of subsidies, and the legisla-
tive history of the law.
The CIT declined to adopt the Commerce Department's
definition of a subsidy. 3 ' The CIT stated that the counter-
vailing duty law is not a tool of foreign policy; rather, its pur-
pose is to protect domestic industry subsidized from goods im-
ported into the United States.' 3 ' In order to effectuate this do-
mestic purpose, Congress intended the law to apply without
exception.13 2 According to the CIT, the Commerce Depart-
ment's fundamental error was its premise that a subsidy can
exist only in a market economy.' 33 In contrast to the Com-
merce Department, the CIT defined subsidization as the en-
couragement of exportation through some form of special
preference. 134 The CIT asserted that the Commerce Depart-
ment's position suggested the "absurd" result that the more
completely a government becomes involved in production, the
less likely it is to be subsidizing.'3 5
The CIT also stated that the Commerce Department's po-
sition was at odds with the plain meaning and remedial pur-
pose of the countervailing duty law and inconsistent with judi-
cial interpretation and past administration of the law. 136 The
CIT noted that the law was carefully drafted to apply to all
countries, regardless of their economic structure. 3 7 In addi-
tion, the CIT argued, the Commerce Department's position
129. See Continental Steel Corp. v. United States, 614 F. Supp. 548 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1985).
130. See id. at 553; supra text accompanying note 104 (Commerce Department's
definition of subsidy).
131. Continental Steel, 614 F. Supp. at 553.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 550.
134. Id. at 553.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 550.
137. Id. at 551. The court wrote:
In the opinion of the Court the language of this law is perfectly indiffer-
ent to forms of economy. The language plainly shows the strongest possible
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would diminish the remedial effect of the law.'" 8 The CIT
noted that the history of the administration of the counter-
vailing duty law did not show the development of any excep-
tions based on the degree of centralized control exercised by
the government of the country of production.13 9
The CIT also responded to the Commerce Department's
claim that subsidies in a nonmarket economy would be impos-
sible to identify and quantify because nearly every government
action could be deemed a subsidy, and there would be no mar-
ket value against which to determine its amount. 40 The CIT
noted that the types of subsidies alleged to exist in these cases
were not benefits peculiar to nonmarket economies and, there-
fore, could be easily identified as subsidies.' 4 ' Furthermore,
even if the Commerce Department scrutinized novel domestic
conduct of a nonmarket economy country, that agency has the
ability to detect whether the foreign government is subsidizing
the new conduct.'42 The CIT acknowledged that the Com-
merce Department faces a problem in measuring these subsi-
dies, but noted that this task is "precisely within the expertise
desire to prevent evasion either by means of technicalities of status, or by
technicalities of form, or by technicalities of relationship.
We have a law which uses ten exhaustive alternatives to describe the
possible conveyor of the subsidy.
Id.
138. Id. at 352.
139. Id. at 34; see Memorandum of Plaintiffs in Support of Motion forJudgment
on the Agency Record at 25, 26, Continental Steel Corp. v. United States, 614 F.
Supp. 548 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985) [hereinafter cited as Plaintiffs' Memo]. A major
point in the plaintiffs' brief was that the countervailing duty law has been applied to
goods from countries that were state-controlled to a degree that would meet the cri-
teria the I.T.A. uses to classify nonmarket economies. Id. For example, a counter-
vailing duty determination against sugar from Imperial (Czarist) Russia was upheld in
Downs v. United States, 187 U.S. 496 (1903), even though the Russian government
exercised complete control over the sugar industry through a comprehensive tax and
quota-based system of controls on the processing and sale of sugar. In addition,
countervailing duties were imposed extensively against imports from Germany dur-
ing the 1930's, despite extensive governmental control. Id.
140. Continental Steel, 614 F. Supp. at 554; Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland
III, supra note 101, at 19,376.
141. Continental Steel, 614 F. Supp. at 554; see Plaintiffs' Memo, supra note 139, at
45.
142. Continental Steel, 614 F. Supp. at 554. "All that will be needed in these cases
is the ability to distinguish between the normal operation of central control and the
exceptional or ... unfair event. It would be wrong for the Court to be more specific
at this time about the method of detecting subsidies within a nonmarket economy."
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of the agency." 14 3
The CIT rejected the Commerce Department's argument
that legislative amendments to the antidumping provision
demonstrated congressional intent to exclude application of
the countervailing duty law to nonmarket economy goods. 14 4
In the CIT's opinion, the amendment of the antidumping law
was irrelevant, because unlike the antidumping provisions, the
countervailing duty law does not require fair market value as a
reference point. 45 In addition, that Congress refrained from
amending the law indicates that the law needed no clarifica-
tion, and applied to all forms of economies. 146 Finally, the CIT
refuted the Commerce Department's argument that Congress'
enactment of section 406 of the Trade Act of 1974147 was evi-
dence that the countervailing duty law did not apply to goods
from nonmarket economy countries. In the CIT's opinion,
section 406 is merely an alternative method of dealing with the
problem. 148
C. Decision of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the
CIT's decision and upheld the Commerce Department's deter-
mination that the countervailing duty law does not apply to im-
ports from nonmarket economy countries. The Federal Cir-
143. Id. "If there are any difficulties here, they are not difficulties of meaning,
but problems of measurement... Id. The court did not expound further on the
Commerce Department's presumed expertise. But see Plaintiffs' Memo, supra note
139.
Lastly, the ITA's decision seeks refuge in the premise that countervailing
duties would be too difficult to calculate in [nonmarket economy] proceed-
ings. Previous experience, however, suggests that the ITA is far too modest.
Indeed, the ITA has proven itself ingenious at calculating duties in the face
of immensely complicated factual situations. See, e.g., Cold-Rolled Carbon
Steel Flat-Rolled Products from Argentina, 49 Fed. Reg. 18,006 (1984) (de-
veloping present value method of calculating the subsidy element in prefer-
ential loans, grants, and equity infusions).
Id. at 39.
144. Continental Steel, 614 F. Supp. at 555.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, tit. 4, § 406, 88 Stat. 1978, 2062
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2436 (1983)); see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
148. Continental Steel, 614 F. Supp. at 555. "Section 406 is a separate remedy for
separate circumstances. The potent specialized nature of the countervailing duty law
is not affected by the existence of possible alternative remedies." Id.
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cuit based its decision on the purpose of the countervailing
duty law, the nature of nonmarket economies and the actions
Congress has taken to revise statutes other than the counter-
vailing duty statute to deal specially with the issue of imports
from nonmarket economy countries. 49
The Federal Circuit stated that the purpose of Congress in
enacting the countervailing duty law was to protect domestic
industries against "unfair" competition resulting from subsi-
dies that distort the market process and give foreign producers
a competitive advantage. The Federal Circuit found, however,
that this kind of "unfair" competition cannot exist in imports
from nonmarket economy countries. Since in a nonmarket
economy central planners decide what entities will sell what
goods where and at what prices and terms, the nonmarket
economy is already replete with distortions. Thus, concluded
the Federal Circuit, governments in nonmarket economies do
not provide the kind of "bounty" or "grant" for which Con-
gress prescribed the imposition of countervailing duties.' 50
The Federal Circuit found further support for its conclu-
sion in the action of Congress in dealing with the problem of
imports from nonmarket economy countries in other statutory
provisions. Echoing the Commerce Department's argument,
the Federal Circuit noted that Congress has amended the an-
tidumping law in both the Trade Act of 1974 and the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979 to make it more effective in dealing
with imports from nonmarket economies, while it remained si-
lent about the application of the countervailing duty law to
such imports even though both statutes presented similar
problems in application.' The Federal Circuit found such in-
action to be evidence of a congressional belief that the coun-
tervailing duty law did not apply to nonmarket economies.
Finally, the Federal Circuit addressed the amici curiae ar-
gument that the Commerce Department's construction of the
countervailing duty statute subverts the statute's purpose be-
cause it excepts from the countervailing duty law countries that
149. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, No. 85-2805, slip op. at III (Fed.
Cir. Sept. 18, 1986).
150. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, No. 85-2805, slip op. at III A
(Fed. Cir. Sept. 18, 1986).
151. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, No. 85-2805, slip op. at III B 1 &
2 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 18, 1986); see supra notes 117 and 121.
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are the worst distorters of world markets. In reply the Federal
Circuit stated that Congress has decided that the antidumping
statute is the proper method for protecting the American mar-
ket against goods sold by nonmarket economies at unreasona-
bly low prices. If that remedy is inadequate, then it is up to
Congress to provide the additional remedies it deems appro-
priate. 152
III. ANALYSIS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
This section of the Note compares the approach of the
Commerce Department to that of the Court of International
Trade and outlines the ramifications of each. As noted, the
Federal Circuit essentially adopted the Commerce Depart-
ment's position. Finally, suggested approaches to the problem
are offered.
A. Comparison and Analysis of Approaches
As the Continental Steel ' 53 case illustrates, the Commerce
Department and the Court of International Trade differ funda-
mentally in their approach to resolving the issue of whether
the countervailing duty law applies to' imports from nonmarket
economies. Each begins with a different definition of subsidy.
The Commerce Department defines a subsidy as a distortion of
the market process that results in a "misallocation of re-
sources, encouraging inefficient production and lessening
world wealth."'5 4 This contrasts sharply with the CIT's defini-
tion of subsidy as "the encouragement of exportation by
means of some type of special preference."' 55 Thus, the Com-
merce Department focused on the subsidy's effect on the world
economy, while the CIT focused on the effect of subsidized im-
ports on the United States economy. 156 It is in the definition
of subsidy and the articulation of the broad purpose of the
countervailing duty law that the Commerce Department's posi-
152. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, No. 85-2805, slip op. at III C
(Fed. Cir. Sept. 18, 1986).
153. Continental Steel Corp. v. United States, 614 F. Supp. 548 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1985).
154. Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland III, supra note 101, at 19,375.
155. Continental Steel, 614 F. Supp. at 553.
156. Id. at 553; see supra note 154.
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tion seems weakest. 57 As the CIT pointed out, the counter-
vailing duty law was enacted to assure effective protection of
domestic interests from foreign subsidies, and since its incep-
tion the court has interpreted the law broadly to effectuate that
purpose.1 58 The countervailing duty law was meant to be con-
cerned with the subsidy's effect not on world trade, but on fail-
ing United States industries.' 59
The Commerce Department and the CIT also differed on
the issue of whether a subsidy can even be found in a
nonmarket economy. According to the Commerce Depart-
ment, a subsidy is detected by its economic effect on the laws
of supply and demand.160 A subsidy is a market phenomenon,
and therefore cannot exist in a nonmarket setting.1 6 1 The CIT,
on the other hand, noted that a subsidy can be found in any
economy in which the government or private sources favor the
manufacture, production, or export of particular merchan-
dise. 1 62 The CIT was also more persuasive on this point. Con-
gress, in enacting the countervailing duty law, was not con-
cerned with the effect of the government benefit on the export-
ing country's economy, but rather, on the negative effect that
subsidized imports would have on the United States econ-
157. See Reply Memorandum of Plaintiffs in Support of Motion forJudgment on
the Agency Record at 21-23, Continental Steel Corp. v. United States, 614 F. Supp.
548 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985) [hereinafter cited as Plaintiffs' Reply Memo]..
The ITA's restrictive construction contravenes Congressional intent that
Section 303 be broadly applied and, therefore, is not entitled to deference.
In ASG Industries, Inc. v. United States, 610 F.2d 770, 776 (C.C.P.A. 1979), the
Court rejected a limiting administrative interpretation on Section 303, stat-
ing: "To permit the Secretary to place a narrow or restricted interpretation
on 'bounty' or 'grant' as a basis for a negative countervailing duty determi-
nation would clearly frustrate the Congressional purpose of 'assuring effec-
tive protection of domestic interests from foreign subsidies.'" Further-
more, the unbroken pattern of legislative amendments over the past ninety
years reflects a continuing effort to strengthen and render more effective the
countervailing duty law.
Id. at 21.
158. Continental Steel, 614 F. Supp. at 553-54.
159. See Plaintiffs' Reply Memo, supra note 157, at 2. "As should be self-evident,
the countervailing duty law is concerned-not with resource allocation in Poland and
Czechoslovakia-but rather with the effect of subsidized imports on U.S. industry."
Id.; see supra notes 17-32 and accompanying text (regarding legislative history).
160. Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland III, supra note 101, at 19,375.
161. Id.
162. Continental Steel, 614 F. Supp. at 554.
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omy. ' 63
The crux of the Commerce Department's ruling, however,
was the difficulty in applying the countervailing duty law to
goods from nonmarket economies. 164 On this point, the Com-
merce Department's position that the identification and quan-
tification of countervailing duties is virtually impossible in
nonmarket economies may be valid.' 6 5 The CIT was perhaps
overconfident in the ability of the Commerce Department to
identify every situation in which a countervailing duty could
arise and to estimate the value of such duties. 166 The CIT's
opinion gave the Commerce Department little guidance and
stated merely that
[a]ll that will be needed in these cases is the ability to distin-
guish between the normal operation of central control and
the exception or disproportionate or unfair event. It would
be wrong for the Court to be more specific at this time
about the method of detecting subsidies within a nonmarket
economy. ' 6
7
The CIT's approach thus relied on standards that reflected the
normal commercial situation encountered by business in that
nonmarket economy country. 168
Depending on the type of subsidy involved, the Com-
merce Department would encounter varying degrees of diffi-
culty in levying a countervailing duty. For example, the Com-
merce Department would have little trouble in identifying and
quantifying "export" subsidies.' 69  If a nonmarket economy
country producer is receiving economic support for exports,
but not for domestic sales, then an export subsidy would ex-
163. See supra note 16 and accompanying text; see also S. REP. No. 1298, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 183, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7318. The pur-
pose of the countervailing duty law is to ensure effective protection of domestic inter-
ests from subsidized foreign imports. Id.
164. See supra text accompanying note 107. Defendant's Memorandum in Oppo-
sition to Plaintiff's Motions for Review at 5, Continental Steel Corp. v. United States,
614 F. Supp. 548 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985). "[I]f in adopting a particular interpretation
of the law the ITA cannot thereafter administer it in a reasonable manner, then it has
no choice but to reject that interpretation." Id.
165. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
167. Continental Steel, 614 F. Supp. at 554.
168. See id.
169. See Rosen & Benjamin, Court Spurns Narrow Reading of Import Duty Law, Legal
Times, Sept. 30, 1985, at 11, col. 1.
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ist.170 The Commerce Department could establish the value of
the subsidy by comparing the prices the firm receives for ex-
port goods with those received for nonexport goods. 171 Under
the facts of Continental Steel, the Commerce Department could
easily identify and quantify the alleged subsidies, because the
subsidies in that case were conventional export subsidies not
peculiar to nonmarket economies.' 72
In several areas, however, the Commerce Department
could have great difficulty in applying the countervailing duty
law to goods from nonmarket economy countries. 73 "Domes-
tic" subsidies, for example, may be more difficult than "ex-
port" subsidies to identify and measure. 7" The Commerce
Department would have to determine whether the government
grant is selective, and whether it "distort[s] . . .a pattern of
regularity."'' 75 In addition, when a foreign government invests
directly in a foreign exporter, the government's participation is
countervailable if it is on terms "inconsistent with commercial
considerations."'' 76 However, in the absence of ordinary com-
mercial indicators, it may be difficult to measure subsidies of
this type.' 77  Likewise, government labor assistance pro-
grams' 78 and government loans 79 may obscure whether the
170. Id.
171. See supra note 60 (discussion of how Commerce Department quantifies sub-
sidies).
172. See Continental Steel, 614 F. Supp. at 554. "The subsidies alleged to exist
here are not acts which are peculiar to nonmarket economies." Id.; Plaintiffs' Memo
supra note 139, at 45. "[T]he practices alleged are conventional export subsidies that
are defined in the precedents interpreting section 303 and in the Illustrative List.
Even the ITA admits that some of the incentives tied to exports which Plaintiff's
alleged 'might be considered export subsidies.'" Id.
173. See supra note 4 (definition of domestic subsidy).
174. Continental Steel, 614 F. Supp. at 554.
175. Id.; see Rosen & Benjamin, Court Spurns Narrow Reading of Import Duty Law,
Legal Times, Sept. 30, 1985, at 11, col. 2.
176. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B)(i) (1982).
177. See Rosen & Benjamin, Court Spurns Narrow Reading of Import Duty Law, Legal
Times, Sept. 30, 1985, at 11, col. 2.
178. "To be countervailable, a benefit program for workers must give preferen-
tial benefits to workers in a particular industry or in a particular targeted region."
Certain Steel Products from Belgium, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,304, 39,319-20 (1982). See
generally J. PATriSON, supra note 3, at 6-57.
179. SeeJ. PArrISON, supra note 3, at 6-34 n.l. "A loan guarantee by a govern-
ment is generally considered a subsidy to the extent it assures more favorable terms
than are otherwise available in the commercial market. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B)(i)
(1982)." Id.
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foreign government is providing a subsidy, and if so, to what
extent.' 80 Thus, the CIT might have glossed over the problem
of identifying and quantifying subsidies in nonmarket econo-
mies which could have resulted in applying the law in an arbi-
trary and capricious manner.' 8
The Commerce Department and the Federal Circuit found
that Congress' refinement of the antidumping law' 82 and adop-
tion of section 406 of the Trade Act of 1974 '83 indicated that
the countervailing duty law does not apply to goods from
nonmarket economy countries. This seems the most telling ar-
gument for concluding that the countervailing duty law does
not apply to imports from nonmarket economy countries. The
Commerce Department and the Federal Circuit might be led to
the view that when Congress twice amended the antidumping
law to make that law more effective in dealing with imports
from nonmarket economy countries, and did not amend the
countervailing duty law to correct similar problems, it believed
that the countervailing duty law had no application to
nonmarket economy countries. This conclusion, however, is
unsupported by the legislative history of either law. 184
B. Ramifications of the CIT's Approach to the
Countervailing Duty Law
The affirmance of the decision of the Court of Interna-
tional Trade would have been a victory for United States in-
dustries whose products compete with nonmarket economy
imports. Filing of countervailing duty petitions against goods
from nonmarket economy countries would have been possible,
and especially attractive, because nonmarket economy coun-
tries are not entitled to an injury test before the International
180. See Rosen & Benjamin, Court Spurns Narrow Reading of Import Duty Law, Legal
Times, Sept. 30, 1985 at 11, cols. 2-3.
181. See Applicability of Laws to Nonmarket Economies Discussed at Commerce Hearing, 9
U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 6, at 227 (Nov. 9, 1983). As Senator Strom Thur-
mond stated at the Commerce Department's "novel" issue hearing, see supra note 85
and accompanying text, "[t]he government must come to Congress to seek changes
in the law .... not 'ignore or misapply' it." Id.
182. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
183. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, tit. 4, § 406, 88 Stat. 1978, 2062
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2436 (1982)); see supra note 120 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
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Trade Commission. 18
5
A victory for United States producers, however, would
have been a defeat for both United States importers and con-
sumers. Once the Commerce Department finds a subsidy, the
statute mandates the levy of a countervailing duty.186 The im-
position of a countervailing duty always results in a higher
price to consumers and importers.187 Therefore, in cases in
which United States industries are not injured, consumers are
penalized without receiving any corresponding benefit to the
domestic economy. The countervailing duty law could thus be
viewed as a competitive weapon for United States industries,
rather than a protective device against artificial export stimu-
lants. 188
In addition, mandatory application of the law could affect
sensitive political relations with nonmarket economy coun-
tries. 89 Countervailing duty investigations typically relate to
actions of governments, 90 and are therefore infinitely more
delicate than, for example, antidumping actions, which are di-
rected at an individual firm's price discrimination.' 9 ' Many of
the programs that the Commerce Department deems
countervailable lie at the heart of a foreign government's do-
mestic policy, and therefore touch upon the sovereign con-
cerns of that government.' 92 A countervailing duty investiga-
185. See supra text accompanying note 31.
186. See supra note 1.
187. See S. METZGER, supra note 2, at 124.
188. See Feller, Mutiny Against the Bounty: An Examination of Subsidies, Border Tax
Adjustments and the Resurgence of the Countervailing Duty Law, 1 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
17, 26 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Mutiny Against the Bounty]; Feller, The Antidumping
Act and the Future of East-West Trade, 66 MICH. L. REV. 115, 133 (1967). "Counter-
vailing duties could be imposed even if the export price were too high to be competi-
tive in the United States market or if the volume were too small to injure or threaten
to injure a domestic industry." Id.
189. Concern over political relations was the basis of the Commerce Depart-
ment's negotiations with the domestic textile industry to withdraw its countervailing
duty petition against imports from the People's Republic of China. See supra note 86
and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 22.
191. See UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY IN AN INTERDEPEN-
DENT WORLD, PAPERS SUBMITTED TO THE COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
INVESTMENT POLICY AND PUBLISHED IN CONJUNCTION WITH COMMISSION's REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT 412 (July, 1971).
192. Note, Protecting Steel: Time For A New Approach, 96 HARV. L. REV. 866, 871
(1983). This commentator queries how United States citizens would react if the gov-
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tion not only points out the clear economic and social differ-
ences between market and nonmarket economies, but also
could be perceived as an attempt to ascribe capitalist values to
socialist ideology.19 3
. The Court of International Trade's decision gave the
Commerce Department little guidance as to how to identify
and measure subsidies in nonmarket economies. 194 In addi-
tion, the Commerce Department faced the problem of acquir-
ing essential information about alleged subsidies from often
uncooperative nonmarket economy countries. 195 On a practi-
cal level, the Commerce Department would have had a very
difficult task, and its decisions might have resulted in arbitrary
and capricious determinations.19 6
C. Ramifications of the Commerce Department's Approach to the
Countervailing Duty Law
The Federal Circuit's affirmance of the Commerce Depart-
ment's position that the countervailing duty law does not apply
to imports from nonmarket economies leaves domestic indus-
tries with one less mechanism with which to combat the rising
level of imports from nonmarket economies.197 The remaining
unfair import competition remedies, such as the antidumping
law and section 406, are either more difficult to implement
than the countervailing duty law or have proven to be ineffec-
tive.19 8 By comparison, a remedy based on the countervailing
ernments of Western European countries announced that they were imposing coun-
tervailing duties on cars imported from the United States. Id. n.31.
193. See Note, supra note 85, at 419.
194. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text (information necessary for fil-
ing a countervailing duty petition).
196. See Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland III, supra note 101, at 19,376.
197. In 1970 nonmarket economy country imports to the United States totalled
$217 million compared to $3,183 million in 1983. UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE STATISTICS YEARBOOK 1180 (1985). However, "[f]rom an economic perspec-
tive, the nonmarket economies have the long-term potential to buy and sell much
more in world markets than they do presently. These countries comprise about one-
third of the world's population and about one-quarter of its land area. Their coin-
bined GNP is roughly equal to that of the United States." COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S
REPORT, supra note 5, at 3.
198. In 1984, then Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade, Lio-
nel H. Olmer, noted that "[iun applying the antidumping law to NME's [nonmarket
economies] we have found the present statute and regulations to be enormously bur-
densome and excessively complicated, in comparison to the law as applied to market
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duty law would be easier to obtain because the plaintiff does
not need to prove a material injury.' 99 In addition, the coun-
tervailing duty law is sometimes the only unfair import remedy
available.200
D. Suggested Approaches
The issue of whether the contervailing duty law should ap-
ply to imports from nonmarket economy countries is ill-suited
to resolution by the courts. Only Congress can undertake the
necessary inquiry into the economic and political ramifications
of such an application. If Congress believes that domestic in-
dustries are entitled to protection from subsidized imports
from market economies, it is difficult to understand how Con-
gress could conclude that domestic industries are not entitled
to protection from subsidized imports from nonmarket econ-
omy countries. Highly theoretical and often strained argu-
ments as to the meaning of subsidy and "unfair" competition
fail to provide satisfactory answers. Congress would also have
to consider, however, whether the political and administrative
problems inherent in the application of the countervailing duty
law to nonmarket economy countries would make such legisla-
tion unwise.2° 1 A number of legislative approaches have been
suggested to alleviate these concerns. For example, commen-
tators have suggested that the countervailing duty law be
economies. The results are often unpredictable .... " Nonmarket Economy Imports
Legislation: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on International Trade of the Committee on Fi-
nance, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Nonmarket Economy Imports
Legislation Hearing]. But see BNA Interview with Alan Holmer, Former Commerce Department
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Import Administration, 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 32, at
1016 (Aug. 7, 1985). When questioned about what recourse United States industries
will have if the Commerce Department's position of not applying the countervailing
duty law to nonmarket economies stands, Holmer stated, "Petitioners continue to
have the same remedy that they have in fact used often: they can bring an antidump-
ing case. The size of the dumping margins found in cases involving non-market
economies over the last year or two underscores the viability of this option, that is
readily available to petitioners." Id. at 1017. However, situations in which subsidies
are present do not always give rise to sales at less than fair market value, and there-
fore do not give rise to antidumping actions. See supra note 3. No United States
petitioner has ever received relief under section 406. See Horlick & Shuman,
Nonmarket Economy Trade and U.S. Antidumping/Countervailing Duty Laws, 18 INT'L LAW.
807, 827 (1984).
199. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 3.
201. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 5, at 3, 27.
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amended to permit its discretionary application, in order to
preserve sensitive political relations.20 2 It has also been re-
minded that nonmarket economy countries could be given the
advantage of an injury test, if they sign the Subsidies Code or
assume equivalent obligations.20 3 Proposals have also been
made that would ease the administration of the countervailing
duty law by establishing standards for the quantification of
subsidies.20 4
1. Proposals for Discretionary Application of the
Countervailing Duty Law and Inclusion of the
Injury Test
Commentators have suggested that Congress amend the
countervailing duty statute to permit the President to waive the
imposition of countervailing duties when he determines that it
would be in the interest of the United States not to countervail
imports from a particular country.20 5 This proposal, however,
is unlikely to win favor with the Executive Branch. 20 6 In order
to prevent Congress from passing additional protectionist leg-
islation, the President must show that existing remedies, such
as the countervailing duty law, provide United States indus-
tries adequate protection from unfair imports.20 7
It has also been suggested that the nonmarket economy
countries themselves could help ensure that United States in-
dustries do not use the countervailing duty law offensively by
signing the Subsidies Code or assuming equivalent obliga-
tions, thus acquiring the protection of the material injury
202. See infra notes 205-07 and accompanying text.
203. See infra notes 208-12 and accompanying text.
204. See infra notes 213-30 and accompanying text.
205. Butler, Countervailing Duties and Export Subsidization: A Re-emerging Issue in
International Trade, 9 VA. J. INT'L L. 82, 146 (1968); Feller, Mutiny Against the Bounty,
supra note 188, at 17, 64-65; Note, supra note 85, at 419.
The 1979 Tariff Act amendments to the countervailing duty law give the law's
procedural requirements an "adjudicatory cast," which tends to reduce or prevent
the opportunity the law should give decision makers to consider other facts, such as
sensitive political relations with affected countries or national security. Ehrenhaft,
What the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Provisions of the Trade Agreements Act [Can]
[Will][Should] Mean for U.S. Trade Policy, 11 LAw & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 1361, 1365, 1398
(1979).
206. See Butler, supra note 205, at 142. See generally Mervosh, The New Trade Strat-
egy, Business Week, Oct. 7, 1985, at 90.
207. See Butler, supra note 205, at 142.
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test.20 8 If nonmarket economy countries refrain from signing
the Subsidies Code because they are unable to comply with all
of the Code's provisions, 20 9 they could seek protection by ne-
gotiating individualized bilateral agreements with the United
States.21 0 Under such agreements, the nonmarket economy
countries would affirm their adherence to those Subsidies
Code principles that they could uphold, and, in return, the
United States would extend to them the benefit of the injury
test.21 ' Although this proposal does improve the position of
the nonmarket economy countries that import goods to the
United States, it also gives those countries an unfair advantage
over the United States traditional market economy trading
partners by not requiring the same obligations.21 2
2. Proposals to Facilitate the Application of the
Countervailing Duty Law
Commentators have suggested that the problem of quanti-
fying the amount of a subsidy received by an exporter in a
nonmarket economy could be resolved by the use of a hypo-
thetical constructed value in a surrogate country, as is cur-
rently done in antidumping investigations. 21 3 Under this ap-
208. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 5, at 29. It reads in part:
Limiting the need for an injury test, for the most part, to countries under
the Agreement is intended to encourage countries to either sign the Subsi-
dies Code or to assume substantially equivalent obligations. According to
the State Department's comments on our draft report, however, "The selec-
tive extension of an injury test does not appear to have been a useful induce-
ment to countries to sign the Subsidies Code or to assume equivalent obli-
gations."
Id.
209. Some reasons given for nonmarket economy countries not being able to
comply with all the provisions of the Subsidies Code are the need to disclose infor-
mation on certain aspects of the operation of their economies and the impossibility of
identifying and quantifying the net effect of domestic subsidies.
210. Id. at 32.
211. Id. at 32-33.
212. Id. at 33.
213. See, e.g., Nonmarket Economy Imports Legislation Hearing, supra note 198, at 35
(statement suggesting that greater effort to implement the surrogate country ap-
proach with simulated constructed value be made); Applicability of Laws to Nonmarket
Economies Discussed at Commerce Hearing, 9 U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 6, at 226,
228 (Nov. 9, 1983); see also Horlick & Shuman, supra note 198, at 825 (discussion of
theory and its problems). The use of a hypothetical constructed value in a surrogate
country originated in the antidumping case Electric Golf Cars from Poland, in which
United States manufacturers of electric golf cars alleged that golf cars from Poland
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proach, the amount of subsidy would be determined by com-
paring the United States import price to what the cost of
production would be in the nonmarket economy country. 1 4
This nonmarket economy production cost would be computed
by quantifying the raw materials, energy, and labor actually
employed in the production of the good in the nonmarket
economy country and determining their value in a comparable
market economy. 2 5 The benefit of the approach is that it re-
lies largely on public information to determine the production
cost in a market economy and is therefore easy to administer
because it does not require any country but the nonmarket
economy respondent to supply confidential data to the Com-
merce Department.21 6 In addition, surrogate countries could
be identified in advance so that when a particular case arose,
the investigation could be completed within the normal time
frame.21 7 However, this approach presents a variety of
problems, including the difficulty of selecting the "right" sur-
rogate country and the possibility of administrative abuse of
discretion in choosing that country.21 8
Legislation has been proposed in the Congress that would
attempt to solve the problem of quantification of subsidies in a
were being sold at less than fair value. Electric Golf Cars from Poland, 40 Fed. Reg.
25,497 (1975). Because Poland was deemed a nonmarket economy country Treasury
Regulations provided that the constructed value of such or similar merchandise in a
nonmarket economy country could be used. 19 C.F.R. § 353.6. The Treasury De-
partment faced a problem, however, because no other nonmarket economy country
produced electric golf cars. The hypothetical constructed value in a surrogate coun-
try was used as a standard. It has since been added to the hierarchy of Commerce
Department regulations for calculating foreign market value. See 19 C.F.R.
§ 353(4)(a); Cuneo & Manuel, supra note 3, at 292; COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT,
supra note 2, at 15 (drawbacks of simulating foreign market value). See generally Note,
Dumping from 'Controlled Economy' Countries: The Polish Golf Car Case, 11 LAw & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 777 (1979).
214. See supra note 60 (Commerce Department describes how it quantifies subsi-
dies).
215. 19 C.F.R. § 353.8(c).
216. See Horlick & Shuman, supra note 198, at 825. This hypothetical surrogate
approach is, therefore, different from the surrogate country approach, in which the
Commerce Department seeks confidential business data from a surrogate country
that is often uncooperative. Id. at 821.
217. Applicability of Laws to Nonmarket Economies Discussed at Commerce Hearing, 9
U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 6, at 226, 229 (Nov. 9, 1983).
218. See Horlick & Shuman, supra note 198, at 825; see COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S
REPORT, supra note 5, at 22-23 (advantages and disadvantages of simulated con-
structed value).
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different manner.219 Under this approach, in countervailing
duty investigations in which the Commerce Department has
not been provided with the necessary information from the
nonmarket economy country to determine whether a subsidy
exists, a different standard would be employed. 22 0 The Com-
merce Department would not seek to measure value in the
nonmarket economy country, but would look at the price of
imports of foreign market producers in the United States mar-
ket. 22 ' The reference price would be the lowest average price
charged in the United States for a like product from a market
economy country.2 2 Problems with this approach could arise,
however, when there is only one United States producer whose
product competes with the nonmarket economy import.223
The bill's alleged benefit is that it would be simpler and more
predictable than any other approach in applying the counter-
vailing duty law when quantification of subsidies is difficult.
224
219. This bill was first proposed as S. 1966 in 1979 and subsequently revised
and resubmitted as S. 958 in 1981 and S. 1351 in 1983/84. The Heinz bill (named
after Senator Heinz, its chief sponsor) has developed an alternative approach to han-
dling nonmarket economy import problems under the unfair trade laws. See Horlick
& Shuman, supra note 198, at 832. The bill was dropped in conference at the end of
the 1984 Small Fee Congressional Session. Id.
220. See Nonmarket Imports Legislation Hearing, supra note 213, at 2 (opening state-
ment of Senator John Heinz). See generally COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT, supra
note 5, at 20-22 (discussion of methodology of United States market price approach).
221. See Nonmarket Economy Imports Legislation Hearing, supra note 213, at 2, 6.
222. Id.
223. See Horlick & Shuman, supra note 198, at 834; see Cuneo & Manuel, supra
note 3, at 309-10 (problems with lowest free market price approach).
224. Nonmarket Economy Imports Legislation Hearing, supra note 198, at 4-6 (testi-
mony of Lionel H. Olmer, Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade;
further critcisim of the bill).
Based on Commerce's four-year experience administering the AD/CVD
laws, we think they must be substantially improved as applied to NME's. We
believe the artificial pricing investigation proposed in S. 1351 would be sim-
pler and more predictable than current law, and therefore the best way to
protect U.S. industry against unfairly traded NME imports. Domestic manu-
facturers could more effectively anticipate the likelihood of relief, and weigh
the costs and benefits of seeking relief. NME producers could price more
fairly in the first place. Importers would benefit from increased predictabil-
ity by not buying imports likely to be found unfairly traded.
Id. at 6. But see id at 35 (Peter Ehrenhaft's suggestion that greater effort to imple-
ment surrogate constructed value test be made).
The most recent version of this bill seeks to amend only the antidumping law
and not the countervailing duty law. S.1868, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. Rc.
16,000, 16,002 (1985) (Heinz bill).
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CONCLUSION
Having posited for itself the almost impossible task of de-
termining "whether when Congress enacted the countervailing
duty law in 1897 it would have applied the statute to
nonmarket economies, if they then had existed," it seems that
the Federal Circuit erred in deciding that the law should not
apply to such economies. Legislative history and judicial and
administrative interpretations of the countervailing duty law
call for a broad reading of the law to effectuate its original pur-
pose: protection of United States industries from unfair im-
port competition.
Whether the decision of the Federal Circuit was right or
wrong, the issue of the countervailing duty law's applicability
to imports from nonmarket economy countries is ill-suited to
resolution by the courts. Only Congress can undertake the
necessary inquiry into the ecomonic, political and administra-
tive ramifications of such an application.
Karen A. O'Brien
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